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INTRODUCTION
When I was a first-year student at this Law School nearly fifty years
ago, one or more of the professors who reorganized our brains asked
us in several policy contexts what Moses would do. We were asked to
step back in the context of the Socratic discussion of a particular case
or principle of law and visualize the answer to big policy questions.
Moses, of course, was a humble man and tended to understate his
own importance. Having seen the burning bush and having received
Divine guidance and powers, he strove to carry out God's mission. I
do not have the talent or the Divine guidance and powers that Moses
received. Thus, I cannot be the instrument to part the waters or to
take us to the Promised Land by solving and mediating the conflicting
philosophies and interpretations of our jurisprudence as analyzed by
the brilliant scholars at this Symposium.
This Symposium is devoted to in-depth treatment of the law and
economics issues inherent in control transactions. There are a dozen
scholarly papers presented to this Symposium. These papers and the
commentary that followed shine the kleig lights on many important
aspects of this large and complex area. An after-dinner speech is not
the right vehicle to try to rationalize all these issues. Even if I had the
talent to do that-which I do not-it would not be ethical for me to
do so. So I will take some refuge in myjudicial position and say abso-
lutely nothing of any depth or importance.
With that mission in mind, I will try to speak more broadly-but
briefly-about the corporation law. In the course of these somewhat
superficial ridge-running remarks, I will touch on the dynamics of
corporate governance issues, director liability concerns, corporate
control transactions, ethics, and federalism.
t Address at the University of Pennsylvania Law School Symposium on Control
Transactions, February 8, 2003.
tt ChiefJustice of the Delaware Supreme Court.
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I. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
In the 1990s, while the economy and the securities markets were
on the ascendancy, there was a huge paradox developing. The trans-
actions and corporate behavior that led to the demise of Enron,
Worldcom, and others were festering like an undetected carcinoma.
At the same time, in other venues, there was a strong movement to-
ward best practices in corporate governance. That movement was in-
ternally generated in several corporations and was encouraged by
judges, counselors, the American Bar Association (ABA), academics,
institutional investors, and organizations.
Simultaneously and perhaps relatedly, there was in part a reform
movement evolving in the realm of lawyer ethics. The American Law
Institute was working on its Restatement of the Law Governing Law-
yers' and the ABA had initiated its Evaluation of the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct, known as Ethics 2000.2 As it turns out, the Sar-
banes-Oxley Act of 20023 involved a bit of a convergence of corporate
governance and professional responsibility. More about that later.
First, I want to touch on the dynamics of corporate governance in
the context of the standards of conduct of corporate directors. I use
the term "standards of conduct" deliberately because I think we will
agree that it is helpful to separate standards of conduct from stan-
dards of liability of directors. Courts expect directors to act inde-
pendently, with due care and in good faith not only in making busi-
ness decisions, but also in their oversight responsibilities. Liability
may or may not follow a failure to live up to these aspirational stan-
dards.
Structural changes such as the movements toward a preponder-
ance of independent directors, executive sessions of independent di-
rectors, and other best practices are good developments in enhancing
the expectations of standards of conduct. Although state law gener-
ally governs internal affairs of corporations, Delaware law is enabling
and does not spell out issues like the details of independence. And
rightly so, but now some of these corporate governance reforms are
being governed, as to some corporations and influenced as to others,
I RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS (2000).
2 COMM'N ON EVALUATION OF THE RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT, AM. BAR ASS'N,
REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON EVALUATION OF THE RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT (2000).
3 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scat-
tered sections of 11 U.S.C.A, 15 U.S.C.A, 18 U.S.C.A, 28 U.S.C.A, 29 U.S.C.A).
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by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the SEC Rules, and the proposed listing
requirements of the New York Stock Exchange and NASDAQ. Yet,
most aspects of corporate internal affairs and lawyer ethics continue
to be governed by state law, and that mostly means judicially created
and enforced fiduciary duty law.
The keystone of state-based corporation law is the business judg-
ment rule. Investors expect loyal directors to take prudent, carefully
considered, good faith business risks for the economic gain of the en-
terprise. Courts are ill-equipped to second-guess business decisions,
so courts focus on loyalty, independence, good faith, and process.
Although the business judgment rule is not strictly applicable to
the directors' oversight responsibilities, the fiduciary duties of good
faith, loyalty, and due care are. From Chancellor Allen's Caremark
4
decision in 1996 we see that the courts will measure the directors'
standard of conduct and standard of liability by evolving yardsticks
depending on modem developments. In that case we see an empha-
sis on the good faith standard.
There is some debate about whether good faith really is one of the
fiduciary duties or whether it is subsumed in the duty of loyalty. Al-
though the duty of good faith may be subsumed in the duty of loyalty,
the opposite may not be true. Thus, I think it may be accurate to con-
sider the duty of good faith as an additional duty beyond the duty of
loyalty, at least for some purposes. Certainly, a director who subli-
mates the corporate interest to the director's own personal interest is
probably acting disloyally and is probably not acting in good faith.
But perhaps not all failures to act in good faith will necessarily impli-
cate disloyal concepts of self-interest or self-dealing.
In my opinion, good faith requires an honesty of purpose and es-
chews a disingenuous mindset of seeming on the surface to act for the
corporate good, but not caring for the well-being of the constituents
of the fiduciary. Although the concept of good faith is not fully de-
veloped in the case law, an argument could be made that reckless, ir-
responsible, or irrational conduct but not necessarily self-dealing or
larcenous conduct could implicate concepts of good faith. Moreover,
in the new, post-Enron era of corporate responsibility requiring new
standards mandated by Congress, rules of self regulatory organizations
(SROs), or voluntary best practices, good faith may emerge as a cen-
tral issue of the directors' standard of conduct. It may or may not
emerge as a standard of liability, however.
4 In re Caremark Int'l, Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959 (Del. 1996).
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Irrationality is the outer limit of the business judgment rule and
may be the functional equivalent of the waste test or it may show that a
decision is not made in good faith. If the board's decision or conduct
is irrational or so beyond reason that no reasonable director would
credit the decision or conduct, lack of good faith may, in some cir-
cumstances, be inferred.
It is important to corporate America that we have directorial can-
didates who are willing to serve, and that they be provided with ade-
quate pay, indemnification, and insurance. Sarbanes-Oxley may have
shrunk the universe of those candidates, but that is another issue for
another day. Directors should not be seen as guarantors of good re-
sults or preventors of the malfeasance, misfeasance, or nonfeasance of
others. They should be entitled to rely in good faith on corporate
documents, committees, and experts to a significant degree in making
their business judgments. And they should not be held personally li-
able for negligence. In this connection, the Delaware statutory law
may come to aid the director.
Section 141 (e) of the Delaware General Corporation Law provides
that directors shall be "fully protected" in relying in good faith upon
corporate records, reports of officers or committees of the board, or
experts that the director "reasonably believes" to be opining within
that person's expertise and who has "been selected with reasonable
care by or on behalf of the corporation."'5 But if the facts cast doubt
upon that presumption of good faith reliance or selection with rea-
sonable care, the director may have fallen short of an expected stan-
dard of conduct. Whether the director will resultantly be exposed to
liability is another question that will depend on the standard of review
applied to the circumstances. Indeed, Sarbanes-Oxley may play a role
in certain cases.
Section 102(b) (7) of the General Corporation Law permits the
stockholders to include in the certificate of incorporation a provision
exonerating directors from personal liability in damages for mere due
care violations, but not for "breach of the director's duty of loyalty to
the corporation or its stockholders" or for "acts or omissions not in
good faith or which involve intentional misconduct or a knowing vio-
lation of law."6 Moreover, the statute does not eliminate due care as a
standard of conduct, thus leaving it not only as an aspirational goal,
but also an expectation. A breach of the duty of care can be a basis
5 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(e) (2001).
6 Id. § 102(b)(7).
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for equitable relief, as we see, for example, in some contests for cor-
porate control. As far as the Delaware case law is concerned, however,
the jurisprudence on good faith is unresolved.
II. CONTROL TRANSACTIONS
The debate on control transactions that we are in the process of
hearing in this outstanding Symposium is an extraordinary symphony
with half the orchestra playing in A major and the other half playing
simultaneously in B-flat minor. The result is some discord, of course.
Yet, there are some lasting melodies, or at least some phrases one can
take away and hum.
It falls to the Delaware courts to articulate and apply economically
coherent resolutions on a case-by-case basis. Some trash the way that
the Delaware courts have handled this assignment. Others praise
their work. Two quotes from the exposition of the paper by Richard
Kihlstrom and Michael Wachter demonstrate this bipolar academic
review of the performance of the Delaware courts in control transac-
tions:
Ronald Gilson argues that the Delaware standard of management discre-
tion is formalistic and incoherent, lacking an animating principle that
explains why it protects shareholders' interests. More recently, Bernard
Black and Reinier Kraakman have proposed principles to explain Dela-
ware corporation law based on what they call a "hidden value" model.
However, they quickly conclude that the Delaware takeover cases are in-
consistent with their reading of the empirical evidence and with each
other.'
To this, Kihlstrom and Wachter add their own conclusion, stating
in part: "[W]hen faced with the risk of fracturing corporate policy
goals, the Delaware courts' solution, which protects the ability of di-
rectors to manage to their best information, is, at least arguably, the
best rule."8
Who am I to judge that debate? But perhaps one sentence in
one of the papers hit the nail on the head by analogizing the current
jurisprudential construct to a paraphrase of Winston Churchill's
7 Richard E. Kihlstrom & Michael L. Wachter, Corporate Policy and the Coherence of
Delaware Takeover Law, 152 U. PA. L. REv. 523, 523-24 (2003).
8 Id. at 575.
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observation about democracy. That is, the Delaware model may be
inadequate-except when compared to all the alternatives.9
One does see in our courts a diverse parade of animals. There
are, for example, unsolicited tender offers; friendly tender offers;
mergers after a market canvass; stealth mergers; a variety of lockups
and other merger contract provisions; proxy contests; poison pills;
white knights; restructurings; independent committees; the business
judgment rule; Time-Warner;1° QVC;11 Unocal/Unitrin;12 Revlon;13 Bla-
sius;" Liquid Audio;5 Omnicare;6 and concepts of compelling justifica-
tion, entire fairness, the vicinity of insolvency, etc. What one sees in
the debates we are having at this excellent Symposium is another set
of variable alternatives-should the Delaware courts, or perhaps its
legislature, stand pat, clarify, tweak, or dismantle its principles on con-
trol transactions? What are the tensions: property or entity primacy;
stockholder or director primacy; change, clarify, or keep the current
balance?
I have read some portions of all the papers submitted at this Sym-
posium and some of the authorities relied on in those papers. I have
9 Lynn A. Stout, The Shareholder as Ulysses: Some Empirical Evidence on Why Investors
in Public Corporations Tolerate Board Governance, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 667, 689 (2003).
10 See Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989)
(refusing to impose a fiduciary duty to maximize immediate share value where the
corporation has not initiated a bidding process to sell itself or abandoned its long-term
business strategy).
11 See Paramount Communications, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 23 (Del.
1994) (holding that the sale or change of control imposes special obligations on the
directors to seek the transaction offering the best value reasonably available to the
stockholders).
12 Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985); Unitrin, Inc. v.
Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361 (Del. 1995). Together, these two cases stand for the
proposition that intermediate scrutiny requires a court to determine (1) whether a de-
fensive measure is draconian, by being either preclusive or coercive, and, if it was not
draconian, (2) whether it was within a range of reasonableness.
13 See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del.
1985) (adopting heightened duties to seek the best value reasonably available to the
stockholders in certain circumstances).
14 See Blasius Indus. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651 (Del. Ch. 1988) (concluding that
conduct that interferes with shareholder voting is not reviewed under the business
judgment rule, but rather, under the compelling justification standard).
5 See MM Companies, Inc. v. Liquid Audio, Inc., 813 A.2d 1118 (Del. 2003) (ap-
plying the Blasius compelling justification standard, rather than the Unocalstandard, to
a board's defensive actions where those actions interfere with shareholders' voting
rights).
16 See Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914 (Del. 2003) (holding
that a court must first determine that defensive measures are not preclusive or coercive
before scrutiny will shift to the range of reasonableness).
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also listened to the dialogue that followed the presentation of the pa-
pers today. Time, and the limitations on my own talents, prevent me
from analyzing the essence of each paper and the comments that fol-
lowed. There is some merit to some of the points made by some of
the critics of Delaware jurisprudence and there is some merit to some
of the points made by some of the defenders of Delaware jurispru-
dence. It is not appropriate for me in my current position-which will
not last forever-to comment substantively on the points made by the
critics and defenders.
But I think I can try to explore the context and history of our ju-
risprudence in order to put these debates into some perspective.
First, most cases end in the Court of Chancery and are never ap-
pealed. Second, each'of these cases comes to our courts in the con-
text of what is often a mosaic of complex facts involving quite differ-
ent structures. For example, the review by the courts of the directors'
response to a pure hostile tender offer with no alternative being sup-
ported by the directors depends not only on the precise terms of the
offer and the defenses in place pre-offer, but also on pre-offer and
post-offer facts and circumstances. These kinds of scenarios may be
quite different from cases, for example, that begin with a proposed
merger of equals or even a cash-out merger agreement, followed by an
unsolicited topping offer by a third party.
In the first type of scenario, one may ask whether there is a kind of
naked 'Just say no" doctrine that permits directors willy-nilly to stone-
wall and hide indefinitely behind the poison pill or other fortresses,
whether pre-offer or post-offer. There is no Delaware Supreme Court
case that stands for this stark proposition. The cases that have come
before the Delaware Court of Chancery and the Delaware Supreme
Court involving hostile tender offers turn on an infinite variety of fac-
tual circumstances and nuanced judicial treatment. So the jargon of
'Just say no" must be qualified by adding that, normally, there must be
more said or done by the directors in carrying out their fiduciary du-
ties than simply saying "nyet!" How much more is the big and unan-
swerable question. In the second type of scenario, it may make quite a
difference-often an outcome determinative difference-what the
target board did pre-merger, what the circumstances were under
which the contractual provisions came into being, and what the board
did post-merger agreement and post-topping bid.
In all these types of cases and the many variations on these
themes, the Delaware courts have used not only their equitable pow-
ers, but also their enormous practical experience to analyze each
2003] 1013
1014 UNIVERSITY OFPENNSYLVANIA LAWREVIEW [Vol. 152: 1007
situation, consider all the facts presented, and apply the jurispruden-
tial doctrines that seem to fit the situations. Of course, one may criti-
cize those jurisprudential doctrines, their application, and the under-
lying policy being implemented. Indeed, litigants are often free to
argue for sweeping jurisprudential change in the context of a specific
case, such as that which happened in 1983 in Weinberger17 and then a
few years later in the four landmark cases in the watershed year of
1985: Van Gorkom,"' Unocal,19 Household, and Revlon.21 Courts are like
"clams in the water." We must wait for a case to articulate our juris-
prudence. Although, as judges, we give speeches and write articles
raising academic issues and exhorting directors to adopt best prac-
tices, we do not reach out and make ex cathedra pronouncements on
reformulating our jurisprudence or forecasting how certain fact situa-
tions should be decided.
Often the central theme of the debate in the mergers and acquisi-
tions area is which body has primacy to decide whether or not to ac-
cept certain proposals-the stockholders or the directors. The advo-
cates of the property model favoring stockholder choice contend that
the stockholders must have that choice although they would want the
directors to negotiate for the best deal. By contrast, those who favor
the entity model rest their policy choice on the primacy of director
decision making, often to the point of saying that directors should be
permitted to "just say no." As former Chancellor Allen and Vice
Chancellors Jacobs and Strine have observed: "[T] he major partici-
pants in the debate seem to be talking past each other., 22 Some of
what follows includes a paraphrase of some other aspects of their fine
17 SeeWeinbergerv. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 712-13 (Del. 1983) (overturning the
traditional Delaware block method of valuation and adopting tools of modern corpo-
rate finance).
18 See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 893 (Del. 1985) (imposing, for the first
time, liability under the duty of care).
19 See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 953 (Del. 1985) (adopt-
ing an intermediate standard of review of defensive measures that has remained the
central rule governing takeovers under Delaware law).
20 See Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1353-55 (Del. 1985) (review-
ing, for the first time, and upholding the "flip over" rights plan as a legitimate defen-
sive measure under the business judgment rule).
21 See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del.
1985) (holding, inter alia, that, when the sale of the corporation becomes inevitable,
the duty of the board of directors changes from preservation of the corporate entity to
maximization of the corporation's value at sale for the stockholders' benefit).
22 William T. Allen, Jack B. Jacobs & Leo E. Strine, Jr., The Great Takeover Debate: A
Meditation on Bridging the ConceptualDivide, 69 U. CHI. L. REv. 1067, 1072 (2002).
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University of Chicago Law Review article published last year on the
"Great Takeover Debate. 23
The property school largely adheres to the efficient market theory
permitting corporate control to be transferred relatively freely be-
tween buyers and sellers.24 Under this model, the directors' only
mandate is to advance the interests of stockholders. There is no sig-
nificant directorial power that would interfere with perceived clear-cut
benefits such as an all-shares, all-cash tender offer, and the only fur-
ther immediate benefit granted to stockholders is that the board has
had the opportunity to seek out a better value or convince the stock-
holders that not tendering is a better choice.
Those who adhere to the entity model view the corporation as a
societal institution with a purpose broader than simply serving the
25economic advancement of stockholders. Often these adherents will
emphasize that what is critical is long-term wealth maximization. Di-
rectors thus have an obligation to exercise an informed, good faith,
independent judgment based on their honest view that the corpora-
tion's best interests are served by a strategy with which the current
stockholders may disagree. The entity model adherents often believe
that there is economic value in allowing boards to make these deci-
sions.
Delaware does not slavishly embrace either model, but gives the
board of directors a central role in corporate decision making, reserv-
ing stockholder assent for many fundamental transactions, such as
charter amendments and mergers. Significantly, there persists a legis-
lative silence, which has prompted the debate in its current form.
I agree with the observation of the Allen trio that "the Delaware
judiciary's reaction to this debate has left neither of these schools fully
satisfied.",26 Maybe that is good-like a settlement where there are no
clear-cut winners or losers. Generally speaking, it is true that the pur-
pose of the corporation is to maximize stockholders' wealth. That
goal is consistent with the property model, but Delaware jurispru-
dence provides directors with substantial authority-depending on
the circumstance-to deploy the poison pill and to block takeover of-
fers even if they may appear to be in the best interests of current
stockholders. Directors often have judicially sanctioned discretion to
23 Id.
24 Id. at 1074-76.
25 Id. at 1076-78.
26 Id. at 1079.
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act in good faith, in the best long-term interests of the corporation, as
they see it. Under some facts, they may reject a takeover offer favor-
able to the present holders when an independent board, acting care-
fully and in good faith, has concluded that the corporation will gener-
ate greater economic returns in the long run under a different
strategy. To this extent, Delaware law is consistent with the entity
model. Sometimes Delaware law allows the directors to consider
other interests, particularly those of creditors in certain dire economic
circumstances. Nevertheless, the permissible consideration of those
interests, when juxtaposed with the primacy of stockholder interests, is
an area of the law that some say is evolving and others say is unclear.
Needless to say, Delaware courts do not allow boards unfettered
discretion to block takeover bids. This Symposium is exploring the
categories and parameters of various regimes ofjudicial review under
which directors must demonstrate the independence, reasonableness,
and good faith of their actions. Some doctrines and applications are
clear. Others still remain theoretically in the realm of open issues.
Returning to the observations of Allen et al., I agree that the status
quo has been criticized for lacking "doctrinal purity," but I also agree
that the status quo has not-at least so far-stymied mergers and ac-
quisitions activity in the United States. 7 Most merger and acquisition
activity has ground to a halt for other reasons, and the current deals
are quite different even from last year's models.
Yet, it is true, as the Allen trio observes, that neither the property
modelists nor the entity modelists are entirely content. The property
school sees too much room for directors to fend off unwanted offers
and wishes for a system that gives stockholders a clear right to decide
for themselves in many situations. To that end, the Allen trio has
noted that "the property modelists have proposed various legislative
solutions, even calling for federal legislation that would mandate
stockholder choice." 8 I will mention federal legislation in a minute.
But, as far as Delaware legislative activity is concerned, the general as-
sembly is usually in a minimalist mode in this area, largely because the
Delaware Bar (consisting of advocates for both stockholders and di-
rectors) is in that mode. Both are generally content to have the courts
work out these complexities on a case-by-case basis, perhaps, in part,
out of the fear of unintended consequences.
27 Id. at 1081.
28 Id. at 1082.
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I will conclude this Part with observations of Allen, Jacobs, and
Strine:
[R]ather than being practical about the resolution of their differences,
the two schools have opted for ideological purity, talking past each other
and never really seeking out common ground.... [B]y adhering to its
current perspective, neither school is likely to have its view adopted in
full by judges forced to decide between them without clear legislative
guidance.
Of course, the Allen trio has offered its own legislative solution. I
will not comment on that or other legislative proposals except to note
that there may be legislation in Delaware this year to provide for per-
sonal jurisdiction in the Delaware courts over officers as well as direc-
tors, who are already subject to that jurisdiction. Assuming no Dela-
ware legislation in the mergers and acquisitions area is forthcoming in
the near term, corporate planners must continue to navigate around
some relative safe harbors and read the tea leaves in structuring or at-
tacking the more aggressive deals that go into uncharted waters. That
may not be easy, but it may not be all bad, either, particularly when
compared to concerns about unintended consequences or overcor-
recting that may lurk in some legislative solutions.
III. FEDERALISM
Now, let me turn to federal activity. Going back to Professor Bill
Cary in the 1970s, there has been an ebb and flow of academic talk
about a "silver-bullet" federal cure for perceived dissonance, uncer-
tainty, and lack of intellectual purity in the way Delaware's three
branches of government handle the internal affairs of corporations. 3
It is true, as Chancellor Chandler and Vice Chancellor Strine suggest,
that state courts may well be seeing fiduciary duty cases premised on
what they have labeled as the "2002 Reforms." 3' To some extent, Sar-
banes-Oxley trumps state internal affairs law, or at least prescribes
29 Id.
30 See William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83
YALE L.J. 663, 701-03 (1974) (proposing a Federal Corporate Uniformity Act that
would create an umbrella of federal corporate responsibility guidelines). For a thor-
ough discussion, see Robert B. Thompson & Hillary A. Sale, Securities Fraud as Corporate
Governance: Reflections upon Federalism, 56 VAN'D. L. REv. (forthcoming 2003).
31 See William B. Chandler III & Leo E. Strine, Jr., The New Federalism of the American
Corporate Governance System: Preliminary Reflections of Two Residents of One Small State, 152
U. PA. L. REv. 953, 953-54, 986-87 (2003) (noting that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
and proposed stock exchange listing requirements, collectively termed the "2002 Re-
forms," will likely generate fiduciary duty cases in Delaware).
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specific requirements where state law is silent. As Chandler and Strine
correctly observe, the 2002 Reforms have generated "creative friction
with state [corporate] law" but this "should not be greeted by state
policymakers with despair."3 2 Rather, it should inspire states to be a
part of the solution.
In my view, many of the state law issues that we are currently see-
ing-as well as new ones-will continue to come before us. There will
be additional considerations, of course, like the 2002 Reforms. Never-
theless, some of the same tensions between director and stockholder
primacy that we are now seeing will continue.
Let me just say a word about the professional responsibility of
corporate lawyers in the context of the federalism issue. First, corpo-
rate counselors are key in shaping the directors' adherence to fiduci-
ary duties. Second, Sarbanes-Oxley and related developments put
enormous pressure on the general counsel as well as outside counsel.
That said, we need to put into perspective concerns about federalism
issues in the area of lawyer ethics.
On January 29, 2003, the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) issued its final rules under Section 307 of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act.3  That statute required that the SEC establish rules governing
professional conduct of lawyers practicing before the Commission, in-
cluding a rule that would require a lawyer to report evidence of
wrongdoing "up the corporate ladder.,
34
When the SEC issued its draft rules in November of 2002,33 there
was some alarm among practitioners that the draft rules were too ex-
pansive and went beyond the mandate of the Act. Among other con-
cerns was the SEC's proposal to require a lawyer possessing evidence
of uncorrected wrongdoing to make a "noisy withdrawal," flagging for
the Commission and the world to see the lawyer's public disavowal of
certain documents or conduct.
The final rules are more limited and have deferred action on
the "noisy withdrawal" requirement and other, more expansive, meas-
ures in the proposed rules. The final rules do retain some measures
that may theoretically conflict with some state ethics rules. But the
3 Id. at 1005.
53 Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys Appearing and Practicing Before the
Commission in the Representation of an Issuer, 17 C.F.R. 205 (2003).
'4 Sarbanes-Oxley Act, § 307, 15 U.S.C.A. § 7245 (West Supp. 2003).
5 Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, 67 Fed.
Reg. 71670 (proposed Nov. 21, 2002) (codified at 17 C.F.R. 205 (2003)).
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question is whether we are in danger of a potential federalism Arma-
geddon. I think not.
The Judiciary tends to assert its authority in two discrete areas that
are relevant here. The first is separation of powers. Intrusion of ex-
ecutive or legislative branches into judicial processes is viewed skepti-
cally to put it mildly. The second area involves principles of federal-
ism. Here the state judiciaries may be in common league with federal
courts as well as state executive and legislative branches in resisting
federal intrusion into matters traditionally vested in the states. Gov-
ernance of the internal affairs of corporations is one of those matters.
Another involves lawyer ethics. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act is involved in
some of each. It remains to be seen whether this legislation and the
rulemaking thereunder will be the high water mark of federalization
in these areas, at least for a time.
The Conference of Chief Justices recognizes the authority of Con-
gress expressly to enact the "up-the-ladder" mandate of Section 307 of
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. The scope of the draft rules released in No-
vember, however, raised for the Conference interesting questions of
the sweep and breadth of federal intervention in state governance of
lawyer conduct. But now, as a result of the action of the Commission
limiting in the final rules the scope of the earlier draft rules and de-
ferring some proposals, I am less concerned about a wide-ranging eth-
ics regime being undertaken by the Commission.
The ethics argument that seemingly implicates concerns about
federalism might be viewed now in a different light than many of us
saw it previously. Section 307 and the SEC rulemaking it mandates
may not really be ethics rules in the traditional sense. On the one
hand, ethics rules are promulgated and enforced by state supreme
courts over a broad range of professional conduct. On the other
hand, Section 307 of the Sarbanes-Oxley statute and the SEC rules it
mandates, though they appear on the surface to be ethics rules, may
more clearly be seen as organic law, external to ethics rules. These
SEC rules constitute the applicable law regulating lawyers' conduct in
a limited area of practice regulation before a federal agency, much
like the practice rules of the Internal Revenue Service or the Patent
and Trademark Office. Enforcement of the federal securities laws, as
distinct from ethics rules, properly belongs to the SEC.
Collision with state supreme court authority over lawyer ethics,
therefore, may have been largely obviated, in my personal opinion,
as a result of the final rules. When the rules finally promulgated un-
der Section 307 are considered as an external, regulatory, organic law
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limited to the discrete area of securities law, the federalism concerns
may be seen in a different light. The Sarbanes-Oxley "up-the-ladder"
rule, while it resembles a mandatory form of Model Rule 1.13 applica-
ble to reporting companies, 36 is, in reality, a regulatory rule much like
other commands in the securities area-e.g., disclosure, certification,
and the like. Model Rule 1.13 is a broad rule governing the ethics of
lawyers for large and small organizations of an infinite variety of
shapes and sizes in a vast range of circumstances.
The Model Rules often refer to, or defer to, organic law. So, here,
the question is probably not whether the SEC is usurping (in a broad
federalization sense) the ethics rules of state supreme courts. The
SEC is not rewriting Model Rule 1.13 or 1.6 over a broad range of
conduct. Perhaps we need not worry-at least up to this point-that
we are in a federalism crisis, insofar as state ethics rulemaking and en-
forcement are concerned.
CONCLUSION
The state-based common law of fiduciary duties implicating the
internal affairs of corporations will continue to be adjudicated, to a
major extent, by the Delaware courts on a case-by-case basis. The co-
herence of this case law will continue to be debated by scholars on
both sides of the property/entity dichotomy.
The federal overlay of Sarbanes-Oxley and the implication of the
proposed SRO listing requirements will be interesting and somewhat
intrusive in the corporate governance area. But in my view they will
not trump most of the state-based statutory or decisional law.
As for lawyers' responsibilities, the stakes are higher in the securi-
ties area. But the state-based ethics regime-while it may be influ-
enced as a matter of scrutiny or moral tone in a subtle way by the Sar-
banes-Oxley SEC rules-is intact and will continue to function. In my
view, there will, however, be a movement toward more cooperation
among the SEC and state lawyer disciplinary authorities.
Finally, let me say that I agree with Vice Chancellor Strine's obser-
vation about the value of the involvement of Delaware judges in these
kinds of academic discussions. It is very helpful for us to hear your
views and for our views to be tested by vigorous academic discussion.
We are constrained in what we can say, of course, but we need to be
exposed to the real world-whether it is academic critique or the
Model Rules of Prof'lI Conduct R.I.13 (1983).
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views of practitioners-and those views will differ, of course. Whether
we take these views with a grain of salt or we take them to heart, sym-
posia like this are healthy.
* * * * * *
